On the morning of October 7, 2023, rocket barrages from the Gaza Strip consisting of round 2,0001-5,000a rockets started to hit targets in southern Israel. Armed motorized paragliders and gunmen in vans, on motorbikes, and technicals streamed by way of holes blown by way of Israel’s once-vaunted border fence and started firing on a combination of civilian and army targets.2 Seaborn divers and small boats attacked different targets on Israel’s coast.3 Around 1,200 Israelis have been killed and round 3,500 wounded; over 240 have been taken hostage.4 There have been many stories of rape, beheadings, and torture.5
Most of the fighters who crossed into Israel have been members of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), however they have been joined by gunmen from quite a few smaller Palestinian factions. The scope, brutality, and audacity of the assaults, together with the weapons programs used, revealed a stage of planning, destructiveness, and functionality that stunned many analysts each out and in of presidency.6
One frequent thread linking the attackers have been their in depth monetary, army, and political connections to the Islamic Republic of Iran. As this text will define, these associations have been the product of in depth cultivation and administration of a Palestinian “Axis of Resistance” by Tehran over a few years.
Along with spreading the Islamic Revolution, one of many predominant objectives of the late Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini was the destruction of Israel.7 In reality, as soon as Iran’s Shah was deposed, it was Khomeini who then invited Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Chairman Yasir Arafat to Iran, the place he was allowed to take over workplace area within the former Israeli embassy.8 Arafat himself instructed a crowd of Iranians that with Khomeini in energy and the Islamic Revolution established, “the street to Palestine now leads by way of Iran.”9 Since that point, Tehran has by no means deserted the aim of Israel’s destruction.10
Iran at the moment lacks the traditional army functionality for a heads-on confrontation with Israel. Proxy forces have allowed Iran to take care of some stage of believable deniability, whereas asymmetrically supplying Tehran with a way to successfully strike Israel or apply strain to it. Furthermore, Iran’s creation of proxy forces has facilitated the unfold of Iranian Islamist ideology.
As but, no ‘smoking gun’ has emerged of direct Iranian involvement in or greenlighting of the October 7 assaults.11 This might replicate the opacity of many proxy-related actions by Iran and Tehran’s deliberate pursuit of believable deniability. Alternatively, it might replicate the truth that whereas Iran cocked the gun, it was its Palestinian proxies that pulled the set off. While praising those that carried out the October 7 assault, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly denied Iran performed any direct function.12 Likewise on November 3, 2023, Hezbollah Secretary General, Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah, claimed the assault was “100% Palestinian” and that those that carried it out “stored it hidden … from everybody.”13
In his November 3 speech, Nasrallah additionally acknowledged that Iran has “at all times been overtly adopting and supporting resistance factions in Lebanon, Palestine, and within the area. However, they [Iran] don’t train any type of management over these factions or their management.”14 This declare shouldn’t be taken at face worth. As this text will define, Iran has made many efforts over time to take care of affect and management over what’s calls the “Axis of Resistance,” and whereas it has not at all times succeeded in getting teams to do its bidding, it has at all times maintained vital sway over its community.
From across the time of the Syrian civil conflict, Iran has labored arduous to domesticate new and previous Palestinian proxies. As it did with Iraqi Shi`a militias in confronting U.S. forces in Iraq within the years after 2003,15 Iran has used Lebanese Hezbollah as a key go-between in creating and sustaining relationships with Palestinian teams. Given the massive Palestinian refugee inhabitants in Lebanon, geographic proximity to the battle zone, and Hezbollah’s loyalty and status as a frontrunner inside the “Islamic Resistance” in opposition to Israel, Iran has been capable of depend on Hezbollah as a powerful agent of affect. Further proxy-building efforts by Tehran amongst Palestinian teams have concerned heavy monetary incentivization,16 supplying weapons,17 help with propaganda,18 and the formation of unified umbrella teams to foment better cooperation between Iran’s proxies.19
Yet, Iran has not solely utilized carrots in its dealings with its Palestinian allies; it has additionally made clear that these advantages will be taken away as shortly as they have been launched if these teams don’t toe the road. Among the sticks Iran has brandished is the crafting of splinter teams to use strain in opposition to organizations which might be or have turn into unaligned with Tehran.
Part One: Iran’s Use of Splinters in Iraq
Recruiting and using splinters from different bigger extra dominant teams, usually from teams that oppose Iran, has been a key Iranian technique in relation to the cultivation of proxy teams and networks.20 For Iran, this method has labored notably nicely over time with Iraqi Shi`a militias. Iran’s formulaic method, confirmed with these Shi`a militias, was then replicated to be used with Palestinian factions.
Iran’s makes an attempt to splinter extra dominant and/or oppositional teams in Iraq is instructive with what it has tried to do within the Palestinian context and notably with Fatah. During the Iraq War (2003-2011) when radical Shi`a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr was main his Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), quite a few splits inside the group started to develop as a consequence of his management and technique. Al-Sadr had a blended relationship with Iran, generally aligning with it21 and at different occasions opposing Tehran.22 In 2006, a gaggle often known as Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous) break up from al-Sadr’s ranks and shortly obtained Iranian support.23 Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq’s then and present chief, Qais al-Khazali, was a founding member of Muqtada al-Sadr’s highly effective Office of the Martyr Sadr and a detailed aide to al-Sadr.24 But he grew to become fed up with al-Sadr’s administration type and started working to construct his personal community.25 In so doing, he took benefit of his contacts with Iran’s IRGC-QF and quite a few main clerics that he had established throughout his prior visits to Iran with al-Sadr.26 This was exploited by Iran, which provided money, coaching, and weapons.27 Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq has since grown into a serious participant inside Iraqi politics and inside the Iraqi authorities funded and acknowledged al-Hashd al-Sha’abi (the Popular Mobilization Forces) militia umbrella group.28
Other proxy networks have been additionally carved out of al-Sadr’s ranks by Iran. When al-Sadr opposed sending further Shi`a fighters to the Syrian War, some Sadrist leaders and their networks disagreed along with his resolution.29 Tehran exploited that division by facilitating the switch of Shi`a militiamen belonging to those networks to Syria and supplying the know-how to construct separate teams.30 From 2013-2016, the Iranians fostered the expansion of teams resembling Kata’ib al-Imam Ali (the Imam Ali Battalions), led by Shibl Zaydi, a former Mahdi Army commander.31 An further Sadrist splinter was Jaysh al-Muwwamal, led by one other former commander of Jaysh al-Mahdi’s successor group, Saraya al-Salam.32 All of those efforts have supplied Iran with a rising affect in Iraq and bigger forces to attract on to serve Iranian pursuits. In addition, the strain and threats of strain Iran exerted on al-Sadr usually pressured him into extra conciliatory positions vis-à-vis Iran due to concern over the loyalty of his personal ranks.33
In 2012, when inner management points arose inside the Iraqi Shi`a militia group Kata’ib Hezbollah, as an alternative of discarding a large community of skilled personnel, Iran allowed the splinter group Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada to type the next yr.34
An identical subject associated to regulate and affect arose inside Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq, when considered one of its former leaders, Akram Ka’abi, break up off and was allowed to type Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba.35
The creation of those new teams from established organizations not solely created teams extra loyal to Tehran but in addition created strain factors on the unique teams to remain in line.36 This was particularly the case with Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba’s relationship with Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq when stories emerged that the latter was not at all times obeying directions from Tehran.37 b From 2020-2021, when Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq reportedly engaged in utilizing entrance teams to launch rocket and UAV assaults in opposition to U.S. targets that had not been sanctioned by Iran, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba was introduced ahead to assert management of all entrance teams used to assault U.S. services and forces in addition to home adversaries in Iraq.38 The effort was possible a transfer to reestablish Iran’s management and preserve a façade of unified Iranian management.
With such money injections, it appeared that Iran had secured affect for years to come back. Yet, in 2013, the conflict in Syria introduced Iran with new challenges for its relationship with numerous Palestinian proxies. Tehran deployed Shi`a militias with a historical past of sectarian animosity towards Sunnis to prop up the Assad regime. These forces have been solid as “defenders of the [Shi`a] shrines” and the “Shi`a resistance.”46 Any foe of Iran or Hezbollah in Syria was branded “takfiri,”47 a time period used to explain ultra-hardline Islamist extremists.d But in actuality, the forces they have been combating on the bottom have been at occasions Syrian Muslim Brotherhood associates from comparable ideological streams as Hamas.48 From 2013-2015, there have been claims of present and former Hamas members becoming a member of and coaching Syrian insurgent teams.49 In 2015, one chief from Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyyah, a Syrian Sunni Islamist group, claimed he had obtained movies from Gaza to help in tunnel repairs in Syria.50
Palestinian camp-turned-neighborhoods, notably Yarmouk, south of Damascus, have been hotbeds of insurgent and Sunni extremist exercise and immediately abutted Shi`a zones.51 This created discomfort for Sunni Palestinian teams resembling Hamas and PIJ of their relations with Tehran. Advances made by Syrian insurgent groups52 and rising sectarianism inside the Palestinian territories added to the tensions.53 Furthermore, the wholesale destruction occurring in Palestinian areas inside Syria54 resulted in lots of former proxies of Iran cooling their enthusiasm for Tehran or outright opposing it. With Tehran waging a sectarian conflict in opposition to fellow Sunnis in Syria,e for Hamas, the 13-month lengthy presidency of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Muhammad Morsi in Egypt from June 2012 to July 2013 opened up the potential of changing the patronage of Tehran with that of Cairo.55
Palestinian Islamic Jihad, for its half, maintained a extra impartial place on the conflict in Syria, however like different Iranian-backed factions, it largely escaped being penalized by Tehran for this resolution.60 However, in 2015, when the group didn’t give messaging help to the Iranian-backed Ansar Allah (additionally known as the Houthis) in Yemen, the group reportedly misplaced for a time frame its Iranian funding.61 “Iran desires all of the factions it considers its allies and offers cash to help all of the political and army positions that [Iran] executes within the area,” mentioned one unnamed PIJ official in January 2016. “The [Palestinian] Islamic Jihad motion didn’t help the Iranian army and political positions, so relations grew to become tense and it received dangerous.”62
Just prefer it had in Iraq to rein in group resembling Asa`ib Ahl al-Haqq, Iran inspired a gaggle to splinter off PIJ, utilizing this as a type of stick to place strain on it. Peeled from the ranks of the PIJ in 2014,63 Harakat Sabireen was small by comparability to Hamas and its PIJ mum or dad group. According to a March 2019 report by Al-Monitor, Iran had, “shifted a lot of its monetary help as an alternative to Sabireen.”64 However, Harakat Sabireen made up for its small measurement by its speedy meeting, elevated funding by Tehran, flashy advertising and marketing, and its resilience even when Hamas made makes an attempt to shutter the group.65 The group, numbering solely round 300, additionally had management components in Iran.66 Sabireen even adopted Lebanese Hezbollah-style iconography to additional clarify its true loyalties.67 f Harakat Sabireen additionally actively disobeyed Hamas’ strictures when it launched rockets into Israel.68
Gunmen from Saraya al-Quds, the armed wing of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, are pictured on April 8, 2022, throughout an anti-Israel
protest within the metropolis of Khan Yunis within the southern Gaza Strip. (Yousef Masoud /SOPA Images/Sipa USA)(Sipa through AP Images)
Harakat al-Mujahideen
While many components of the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades maintained their outwardly Fatah-affiliated branding, different components inside Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades grew into separate organizations with their very own branding and construction. A living proof is the Harakat al-Mujahideen (Holy Warrior Movement), a Palestinian combating group that participated within the October 7 assaults. The group launched a video of “management inspecting [the group’s] forces” inside an Israeli village96 and of beheaded Israeli troops on the Fajah army base close to Gaza in an October 8 video launch.97
Harakat al-Mujahideen’s founder, Umar Atiya Abu Shari’ah, was additionally one of many founders of the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade in Gaza.98 Beginning in 2000, throughout the so-called Second or al-Aqsa Intifada, the precursor networks based mostly alongside the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade’s started to coalesce underneath Shari’ah’s management.99 While components of the Harakat al-Mujahideen have been established within the West Bank, its predominant powerbase has been in Gaza.100 In 2021, Asa’advert Abu Shari’ah, the group’s secretary basic, acknowledged there was “requirement for nationwide unity” that will “carry collectively all the leaders of [the Palestinian armed] factions.”101 After thanking God for the group’s improvement, he thanked “the Islamic Republic of Iran and Lebanese Hizballah as the principle supporters of the Palestinian resistance,”102 demonstrating the group’s pro-Tehran orientation.
Other Fateh Splinters
The Popular Resistance Committees
Harakat al-Mujahideen weren’t the one splinter from Fatah to develop into a brand new group. Another group that grew out of Fatah was the Popular Resistance Committees (PRC). The group claimed it labored with Hamas and different Palestinian teams in finishing up the October 7 assault “killing or capturing numerous Zionist troopers and settlers.”103 On the day of the assault, the group additionally posted photographs of captured Israeli gear, IDs and bank cards belonging to an Israeli soldier.104
It has been claimed that the PRC launched RPG-7 kind grenade launchers into the Gaza Strip.111 In 2006, the previous head of Israel’s Shin Bet mentioned Samhadana was a “legal and a employed killer by the Hamas.”112 The PRC additionally labored with different Palestinian factions (notably Hamas), ensuing within the PRC, Hamas, and Jaysh al-Islam (the Army of Islam) orchestrating the June 2006 seize of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.113 The operation would later end in Lebanese Hezbollah launching its personal kidnapping operation that will set off the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War.114
Part Four: Iran’s Outreach to Leftist Palestinian Groups
Due to the political menace Communism posed to the ability of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, and its atheism, there’s little doubt concerning Ayatollah Khomeini’s hatred of Marxism. From 1982-1983, Khomeini sought to arrest and execute communist opponents in Iran’s leftist Tudeh Party.130 In his 1989 letter to Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev, the Supreme Leader famous, “it’s clear to everybody that Communism ought to henceforth be sought in world museums of political historical past.”131
Regardless of the clear baseline ideological variations, there are commonalities between the Palestinian leftist teams and Iran’s modus operandi. Many of the quite a few Palestinian “Popular Front”-style Marxist factions that emerged within the Sixties and Seventies have been no shrinking violets when it got here to violent actions and terrorist assaults. One of the earliest and strongest organizations of the interval, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) have been pioneers when it got here to hijacking civilian airliners and equipped fighters that countered quite a few U.S. allies and reasonable Arab states.132
The PFLP-GC: Iran’s First Leftist Proxy
In newer years, the late IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani has been given credit score by Palestinian leftist teams for the Iranian embrace of ideologically diffuse Palestinian factions. In a 2021 interview with Hezbollah’s official Al-Ahed journal, PFLP deputy director Abu Ahmed Fouad acknowledged that “the martyr Soleimani completely eliminated problems with bias when he acknowledged, ‘We will put apart any ideological variations and share one aim, resistance to take away the cancerous entity [Israel].’”139 Soleimani was constructing on Iranian makes an attempt to make progress with Palestinian leftist teams.
Iran’s first try to tug a Palestinian leftist group underneath its wing involved the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). Formed in 1968 by Ahmed Jibril after a break up with the PFLP, the group grew to become well-known for its quite a few superior terrorist assaults.140 Jibril dominated the PFLP-GC with an iron fist till his dying in 2021; splinters from his group have been usually killed in retribution for disloyalty.141 At the time, the PFLP-GC favored violent motion and appeared down on extra intellectually centered endeavors, resembling writing papers on leftist concept, that have been swirling round many leftist Palestinian teams.142 This led the group to tug off some audacious terrorist and guerrilla assaults within the Seventies and Nineteen Eighties. In 1987, considered one of these assaults concerned using two motorized cling gliders and resulted within the deaths of six Israeli troopers. It possible served as a type of inspiration for using motorized cling gliders and paragliders by Hamas on October 7, 2023. In reality, on October 10, the pro-Hezbollah al-Mayadeen revealed an article commemorating the PFLP-GC assault.143 The use of those leisure autos as weapons was additionally adopted by elite models of the IRGC, which, for instance, displayed their use in 2019.144
The PFLP-GC maintained shut hyperlinks to Syrian chief Hafez al-Assad and later his son Bashar al-Assad, and acted as a proxy for Syria all through the Seventies and Nineteen Eighties, notably throughout intra-Palestinian combating.145 Adam Dolnik has famous that “the group’s relationship with Syria was a key issue why Jibril by no means achieved the extent of prominence that one may count on based mostly on his army excellence and a contact for spectacular assaults.”146 The group’s violence in opposition to fellow Palestinian teams and willingness to bend to accommodate to the need of Syria led some Palestinian critics to model Ahmed Jibril and the PFLP-GC as having embraced “revolutionary nihilism.”147
Beginning within the Nineties, by way of Lebanese Hezbollah, Iran elevated its contacts with the PFLP-GC. According to Gary Gambill, “a couple of hundred PFLP-GC guerrillas have been permitted to function in opposition to Israel together with Hezbollah all through the Nineties.”148 Gambill has famous that the group lacked practical command and management buildings in Lebanon and was reliant on performing operations with Lebanese Hezbollah.149 Starting in 2000, the PFLP-GC started to aim arms smuggling operations to Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza.150
In the Nineties and 2000s, a number of elements gave Iran alternatives to realize extra affect amongst Palestinian leftist teams. One was Syria’s deepening hyperlinks with Iran throughout the Nineties and 2000s. A second issue was Damascus’ dominance over the PFLP-GC and different “Popular Front” teams. A 3rd issue was the flexibility of Damascus to grant Palestinian leftist teams staging areas in Syria and within the then Syrian-occupied Lebanon. Fourthly, teams such because the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), PFLP, and PFLP-GC all have their headquarters in Damascus. Writing in 1997, Harold Cubert, a chronicler of the PFLP, famous that “with its headquarters positioned in Damascus, and its very existence at the moment dependent upon Syria’s goodwill, the PFLP is in no place to hold out its technique in opposition to Israel and the West, except its host permits it.”151 As Iranian affect in Syria has grown since 2013 as a consequence of propping up the Assad regime, the DFLP, PFLP, and PFLP-GC have undoubtedly needed to more and more reply to and work with Tehran.152
Named after Ahmed Jibril’s son, Muhammad Jihad Jibril, who was killed in a 2002 automotive bombing, Kata’ib Shahid Jihad Jibril (The Martyr Jihad Jibril Brigades) grew to become a brand new militant wing for the PFLP-GC within the West Bank and Gaza.156 Kata’ib Shahid Jihad Jibril subsequently claimed small arms assaults, together with a 2004 capturing assault in opposition to Israelis close to Hebron157 and one in 2005 in opposition to Israeli troops in Nabulus.158 Yet, these assaults have been minor and consultant of a gaggle with little attain.
Kata’ib Shahid Jihad Jibril remained obscure, however by 2018 and notably in Gaza, it was displaying off new capabilities. Despite the PFLP-GC’s actions in opposition to different Palestinians in Syria and restricted affect in Palestinian areas exterior Lebanon and Syria, it appeared the group had not solely gained new younger members, but in addition extra superior weaponry. In November 2018, its members have been photographed with a MANPADS.159 During the October 7 “al-Aqsa Flood” assaults, through which it claimed it participated, Kata’ib Shahid Jihad Jibril claimed the lack of two members.160 Given its overt hyperlinks to Bashar al-Assad’s Syria, with out some type of Iranian backing and Hamas and PIJ permitting it to develop, it’s extremely uncertain the group may have been capable of produce these outcomes organically, notably in Gaza.ok
The PFLP-GC was an apparent group for Tehran to make the most of in Gaza. The Assad regime already had an excessive diploma of management over the group, facilitating Iranian affect.161 In Lebanon, the PFLP-GC needed to get acquiescence from Lebanese Hezbollah with a view to pull off any army assaults in opposition to Israel.162 The group’s diehard membership, historical past of supporting and dealing with Lebanese Hezbollah, and hardcore militarism made it a lovely accomplice to Iran.
The DFLP: Tehran’s Other Popular Front
Originally based because the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1969, the DFLP resulted from a break up from its fellow leftist group the PFLP. Led by Jordanian-Palestinian Christian Nayef Hawatmeh, the small group earned an early status for a powerful communist mental base.163 According to Jillian Becker, the DFLP had “particularly shut ties with the Soviet Union.”164 The DFLP usually acted as a go-between for radical leftist teams and the Fatah-dominated PLO. The group carried out quite a lot of lethal assaults, together with the 1974 Ma’alot Massacre through which over 20 faculty kids have been killed.165 However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, negotiations between the PLO and Israel, and ultimately with Yasir Arafat’s signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords, the DFLP bumped into arduous occasions.
However, by the 2010s, the group was in rising contact with Iran and its proxies. In 2011, the DFLP’s eleventh congress was held in Beirut and included a speech by Lebanese Hezbollah parliamentarian Nawaf al-Musawi.169 During al-Musawi’s speech, it was reported that he “careworn the necessity for the Palestinian factions to beat their political variations, in order that they may very well be [better] capable of confront the Israeli aggression.”170 Meetings, occasions, and different types of coordination with Lebanese Hezbollah endured. In 2013, Lebanese Hezbollah utilized the DFLP to help in distributing meals to Palestinian refugees displaced from combating in Syria. This explicit initiative backfired. Given most of the refugees had simply seen their neighborhoods destroyed by pro-Assad forces, they burned the meals in protest in opposition to the gesture from Lebanese Hezbollah.171
In 2012, the DFLP tried to take care of a place just like that of PIJ concerning the combating in Syria. In conjunction with Fatah and the small Jabhat al-Nidal al-Sha’abi al-Falastini [Palestinian Popular Struggle Front], the DFLP pushed for neutrality for Palestinians residing in Syria.172 While there have been no stories of the DFLP collaborating in combating on both aspect of the Syrian War, the group did preserve a comparatively pro-Assad stance. In 2021, Nayef Hawatmeh even provided his congratulations to Bashar al-Assad when he was re-elected to his place as president.173 Meetings between the DFLP and Lebanese Hezbollah additionally continued nicely into 2023, with a DFLP delegation congratulating Lebanese Hezbollah in July of that yr for its “July victory,” a reference to the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War, saying it was a part of the “path to Palestinian victory and liberation.”174
Moreover, the DFLP publicized its function of sustaining loyalty to the Iranians. The January 3, 2020, dying of IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani was memorialized on their social media. The group posited that Soleimani’s dying would “solely improve our dedication to observe the identical path of [that] martyr commander.”181 Around two weeks later, the DFLP posted materials that despatched barely extra delicate indicators of loyalty to Tehran. During a January 2020 ceremony to honor a freed Palestinian prisoner, Alaa Abu Jazar, the occasion was replete with DFLP members posing with weapons in entrance of “martyrdom” posters dedicated to members of Harakat Sabireen.182
It was the army moderately than political wings of Palestinian leftist teams resembling DFLP that obtained makeovers and elevated help. From entry to newer small arms to heavier weapons and new alliances with extra highly effective teams in Gaza, the DFLP’s KMW displayed them with gusto. Nevertheless, the DFLP’s political wing, notably through social media, didn’t obtain the identical consideration from Iran, showing to nonetheless use previous messaging methods and missing the flashy imagery, uniforms, and a focus allotted to KMW.
Part Five: Tehran’s Strategy of Crafting Unity and Coherence Through Umbrella Groups and Joint Operations Rooms
Umbrella teams and joint operations rooms have been a daily characteristic inside the Palestinian enviornment for many years and have been frequently crafted by numerous Palestinian actors.n In reality, the PLO itself operated as an umbrella group. Some had shorter lifespans than others. In newer occasions, umbrella teams containing outfits a part of Iran’s Palestinian proxy community in Gaza, level to some stage of Iranian affect and course. Iran has frequently demonstrated a need to craft umbrellas for its proxies to prepare ideologically and religiously totally different teams it exerts numerous ranges of management over.
Not all umbrella kind groupings and organizations crafted by Tehran are equal, however the finish impact of them tends to be demonstration of Iranian administration, management, and higher armed group for the teams included inside them. The patronage equipped by Iran and its extra loyal proxies have stood as a logo to different teams that it might not solely be of their curiosity to combat underneath Iranian course, however that this may provide a greater prospect of political and army success.
In Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi) serves as one other instance for Iranian umbrella community building. According to 1 former al-Hashd al-Sha’abi commander, Iran’s pondering was that tensions between totally different teams may very well be managed, defused, and utilized by Iran with the “appropriate loyal males” main the group.186 Since the 2014 formation of al-Hashd al-Sha’abi in Iraq, it has been overwhelmingly dominated by Iranian-backed Shi`a militia teams and commanders.187 Yet, Hashd al-Sha’abi additionally included members that have been loyal to factions that clashed with Iranian pursuits and beliefs.188 o
As already famous, extraordinarily loyal teams to Iran, such because the Badr Organization, make up the most important contingent of al-Hashd al-Sha’abi’s forces. Many commanders of al-Hashd al-Sha’abi arose from the ranks of one other loyal Iranian proxy group, Kata’ib Hezbollah.189 Over time, some Hashd al-Sha’abi teams have been dropped by the Iranians over points starting from loyalty, potential unacceptable ranges of criminality, or as a result of that they had overtly opposed Iran.190 The Hashd al-Sha’abi promoted pro-Iranian messaging and closely promoted factions extra loyal to Iran.191 This demonstrated Iran’s affect over numerous Shi`a militias and its means to construct a core of efficient companions inside totally different factions.
Turning to the Palestinian context, within the hopes of crafting numerous Fatah-splinter, leftist, and Islamist teams right into a extra loyal, militarily cohesive, and politically responsive community, it was in Iran’s curiosity to type new umbrellas for its ideologically heterodox net of Palestinian proxies. One early instance contains the Ten Resistance Organization, created in 1991 on the Iranian-run World Conference in Support of the Islamic Revolution in Palestine.192 Hamas and leftist Palestinian teams created the umbrella group as a protest in opposition to negotiations between Israel and the PLO.193
In September 2023, Hamas and PIJ additionally began a joint operations room in Beirut. According to the official Iranian Islamic Republic News Agency, Iran’s international minister praised the group and “underlined the necessity for unity amongst all of the Palestinian teams.”194
Another joint operations room, which was practical by 2021, primarily included Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas.195 This joint operations room utilized Lebanese Hezbollah as a coordinator between Iran, different Iranian proxies in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, and the Palestinian teams.196 Ibrahim al-Amin, a author with the pro-Hezbollah Al-Akhbar, instructed Hezbollah’s Al-Manar that in 2021 Beirut-based joint operations room included Palestinian factions aside from Hamas, utilized Hezbollah to smuggle Hamas discipline operatives in Gaza to Beirut, and that IRGC-QF commander Ismail Qaani made two visits to the group’s places of work throughout the two weeks of combating between Palestinian forces in Gaza and the West Bank in May of that yr.197
All of the teams concerned with the JOR had excessive ranges of Iranian backing and have been ostensibly marketed as a extra unified drive. “With the power of God, we combat collectively and [will] win collectively,” a December 2020 communique by JOR learn.204 In December 2020, JOR introduced a brand new sequence of armed workouts “to reinforce cooperation and joint actions … [to] completely and repeatedly elevate their fight readiness.”205 JOR posted extremely polished propaganda surrounding the workouts that included launching rockets, simulating taking an IDF hostage from a tank, raiding small buildings, deploying what was possible an Iranian-made Misagh MANPADS, and utilizing an Iranian-made AM 50.206 In different movies from the drill, fight divers simulated raiding coastal targets and JOR fighters interdicted mock Israeli seaborn forces.207 All of those techniques have been later utilized within the October 7 assaults. Citing Hamas, the analyst Joe Truzman famous the coaching operation was “the primary of its type and is an effort to prepared Palestinian militant teams in opposition to a possible army battle in opposition to Israel.”208 Much of the propaganda and statements produced for the JOR adopted fashions that utilized filming, graphics, and even textual content utilized by Iran that had additionally been used for different regional Iranian proxies.209 q
Conclusion
It is feasible that Iran was stunned by the catastrophic success of the October 7 assaults. Tehran might not have anticipated the assaults to have dealt as lethal a blow to Israel as they did. However, there’s little doubt that Iran’s monetary support, structuring of its proxies into extra cohesive armed factions after which into umbrella organizations, and help by way of the provision of weapons elevated the deadliness and extremism of its Palestinian proxies. It can be fairly clear that with out Iranian help and nurturing, these teams wouldn’t have been ready to strike Israel, as they did on October 7 with as a lot success as they confirmed.
Armed capabilities equipped by Iran, resembling quite a lot of UAV designs, rockets, demolition costs, and different munitions, have been smuggled into Gaza and used to lethal impact within the October 7 assault through which Israeli autos, buildings, civilian homes, and commentary posts have been all focused.212 Iranian help allowed its Palestinian proxies to amass the firepower, messaging know-how, and far of the hi-tech gear essential to hold out and propagandize the assault. Financial support supplied by Iran did greater than preserve Hamas working as a governing physique in Gaza; it was additionally immediately piped into Hamas’ terror and army equipment.213
Training supplied to Hamas fighters and the opposite proxies additionally honed their talents to execute the October 7 assaults. As PFLP-GC secretary basic Talal Naji instructed Iran’s al-Alam in August 2021, “Sometimes the coaching befell within the Islamic Republic of Iran, generally in Syria, and generally in Lebanon with the brothers in Hezbollah who’re waging jihad.” While it’s at the moment unknown how Hamas or fighters from different teams traveled to Iran, Lebanon, and Syria, it may be assumed to be through the large community of Gaza’s smuggling tunnels,214 by sea,t or from flights Gazans may take originating exterior of Israel.215
Naji additionally careworn that “as , we’re an axis, an axis of resistance. [IRGC-QF commander Qassem Soleimani] used to oversee himself,” including that Iranian-supplied weapons, such because the Russian-made laser-guided Kornet anti-tank missile, strengthened their capabilities.216 u
Iran permits for a stage of autonomy amongst its proxies, however as this text has outlined, Tehran has moved to punish insufficiently obedient teams, permitting them to wither on the vine, or has engineered splinters to weaken them or strain them into line.
Even if Hamas and PIJ are militarily defeated in Gaza within the months forward, Iran would nonetheless have many choices to work with in each Gaza and the West Bank. As Eurasia Group’s Ian Bremmer acknowledged in an October 31 piece, “The conflict is radicalizing way more Palestinians than Hamas propaganda ever may.”218 Iran will possible try to rebuild its community in Gaza from newly radicalized Palestinians, together with amongst leftist actors, Islamists, and smaller factions they’ll extra strongly management.
In the months forward, it’s possible that Iran will proceed to make use of the carrots (e.g., funding) and sticks (e.g., fostering splinter teams) with a view to preserve and deepen management over its Palestinian “Axis of Resistance.” As Israel’s army marketing campaign in Gaza places these teams underneath rising strain, Iran’s leverage will solely develop. Given Iran has aimed to supply help to a variety of recent and well-established teams, notably these with extra violent tendencies, the radicalizing impact of the conflict on Palestinians supplies fertile terrain for Tehran. CTC
Phillip Smyth makes a speciality of Iranian proxy organizations and Shi`a militia teams. He was previously a Soref Fellow on the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and researcher on the University of Maryland. Hizballah Cavalcade, his weblog on Jihadoloy.web, tracked Iran-backed Shi`a militias throughout the Middle East, together with in Bahrain, Iraq, and Syria. X: @PhillipSmyth
© 2023 Phillip Smyth
Appendix: Iran-Backed Palestinian Organizations
Color Key
Green: Main Islamist organizations (2)
Gray: Leftist teams (3)
Yellow: Islamist Fatah splinters (7)
Light Green: PIJ splinter/Shi`a Islamist (1)
Substantive Notes
[a] Hamas claimed it launched 5,000 rockets. See “Why the Palestinian group Hamas launched an assault on Israel? All to know,” Al Jazeera, October 7, 2023.
[b] It is necessary to notice that following AAH’s use of reportedly unapproved entrance teams to assault U.S. pursuits, Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba chief Akram Kaabi was publicly utilized as a way to exhibit total Iranian management. In December 2021, Kaabi posed in entrance of flags belonging to a large number of the established entrance teams and behaved as a spokesman for them, signifying he—and by extension, Iran—was answerable for all components. See al-Muqawama al-Islamiyyah Harakat al-Nujaba, Telegram, December 9, 2021.
[c] The Bus 405 suicide assault (albeit, not a bombing) is taken into account “the primary Palestinian suicide assault, although … [the perpetrator] survived.” It was launched by Palestinian Islamic Jihad in September 1989. From 2000-2005, Both Hamas and PIJ have been additionally answerable for 65.5 p.c of suicide bombings by Palestinian teams. See Efraim Benmelech and Claude Berrebi, “Attack Assignments in Terror Organizations and The Productivity of Suicide Bombers,” Working Paper 12910, National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007, pp. 5-7.
[d] This is time period is used, usually pejoratively, to explain ultra-hardline Islamist extremists who regard those that don’t observe their method as responsible of apostacy and deserving of dying.
[g] One instance is Iran’s cargo of tons of arms to Yasir Arafat-controlled components of the PLO through the Karine A cargo ship in 2002. Robert Satloff, “The Peace Process at Sea: The Karine-A Affair and the War on Terrorism,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 1, 2002.
[h] While the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade subunit couldn’t be recognized, the kidnapper’s headband included, “Liwa” or brigade. This might level to a hyperlink to Liwa al-Shahid Nidhal al-Amoudi.
[i] It is necessary to notice that in 2015, Jaysh al-Asifa’s head famous that it was “not simple for the fighters of Fatah to hold weapons within the Gaza Strip after the Hamas motion took over.” See Amar Abu Shebaab, “Qa’id jaysh al-’asifa li ‘raya’: tawhid miqatli fatah lays ‘asira w al-’alaqa mah al-qassam taybeh,” Raya, April 20, 2014.
[j] It needs to be famous that the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), a violent splinter from the PFLP, was thought of extra reasonable than its different “Popular Front” cohorts. In the Seventies, when most teams adopted the “Rejectionist” method to realize the total destruction of the State of Israel, the DFLP posited {that a} unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state on any quantity of “liberated land” (by way of armed battle or negotiations) was a preferrable choice. For the DFLP, this territory may function a springboard for the long run “liberation of Palestine.” See Muhammad Y. Muslih, “Moderates and Rejectionists inside the Palestine Liberation Organization,” Middle East Journal 30:2 (1976), pp. 127-128.
[k] The PFLP-GC had already suffered splits contained in the Palestinian Territories as a consequence of points some members had with its actions throughout the Syrian Civil War. In reality, in Syria, the PFLP-GC suffered a break up that resulted in some fighters forming the short-lived Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-Free Command. See “27 2 Damascus Ugarit dimashq, i’alan tashkil al-jebha al-sha’abia al-tahrir falastin al-qa’ida al-hurr al-mishaqa ‘an jebha ahmed Jibril,” Ugarit News, YouTube, February 27, 2013.
[l] The MANPADS within the picture seems to be an SA-7 Strela-type system. If Iranian, it’s possible a Misagh-type MANPADS. KMW’s official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 13, 2019.
[m] The background instrumental music is a track known as “Ya Wa’advert Allah” by Lebanese Hezbollah band Firqat al-Fajr and was launched after the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel War. Different variations (together with instrumental kinds) have been utilized by numerous Iranian supported teams. See “Ya Wa3d Allah … New Version YA-Lubnan.com,” Daily Motion, 2008. In Bahrain, the track was utilized by Iranian-backed Bahraini militants and one other model was made for Iraq’s Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq. See Phillip Smyth, “Singing Hizballah’s Tune In Manama: Why Are Bahrain’s Militants Using the Music of Iran’s Proxies?” Hizballah Cavalcade, Jihadology, May 5, 2014.
[n] One instance is the 2021 “Joint Operations Room.” See Adnan Abu Amar, “Ghurfa al-’amliat al-mushtarkat lilmuqawama fi gaza nuwat li ‘jaysh al-tahrir,’” Al Jazeera, May 28, 2021.
[o] A lot of these teams later broke off. Muqtada al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam started working with the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and lots of factions loyal to Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani shaped their very own community in 2020. See Suadad al-Salhy, “Iran and Najaf battle for management over Hashd al-Shaabi after Muhandis’s killing,” Middle East Eye, February 16, 2020.
[p] Hamas’ Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades; PIJ’s al-Quds Brigades; the PFLP’s Martyr Abu Ali al-Mustafa Brigades; the DFLP’s KMW; the PFLP-GC’s Martyr Jihad Jibril Brigades; the Palestinian Freedom Movement’s Brigade of the Supporters; the Popular Resistance Committee’s Nasir Salah al-Din Brigades; the Palestine Mujahideen Movement’s Mujahideen Brigade; Fatah-splinter/Al-Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade’s Groups of the Martyr Ayman Jawda; The Martyr Nidal Amoudi Brigade; Martyr Abd al-Qader al-Husayni Brigades; and Storm Army.
[q] Similar markers will be seen with movies produced for the Iranian-backed Iraqi entrance group Saraya Thawrat al-Ashreen al-Thania. See Saraya Thawrat al-Ashreen al-Thania official Telegram Channel, Telegram, July 5, 2020. JOR statements additionally match a mannequin utilized by the Iranian-backed Bahraini group Saraya al-Mukhtar: JOR official Telegram channel, Telegram, May 10, 2021, and Saraya al-Mukhtar Official Telegram Channel, Telegram, Telegram, February 20, 2017. At occasions, even the identical fonts have been utilized in these posts.
[s] While it’s unclear whether or not Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia participated and which particular Gaza-based factions of al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade have been concerned, all the different components of the JOR have claimed roles within the October 7, 2023, assault. (See Figure 1.)
[t] In one 2013 case, smugglers introduced in a dismantled Hyundai Sonata from Egypt into Gaza. “Hamas polices seas as tunnel smuggling suffers,” Reuters, November 11, 2013.
[u] The missiles have been additionally used on the primary day of the curent Gaza conflict. See Seth J. Frantzman, “Overwhelmed: The IDF’s first hours combating the phobia waves on Oct 7,” Jerusalem Post, October 16, 2023. Hamas has since claimed using the weapon in opposition to Israeli troopers. See Iran Observer, “Hamas launched a footage of the Kornet missile hitting the Israeli APC …,” X, October 28, 2023.
Citations
[1] Bill Hutchinson, “Israel-Hamas battle: Timeline and key developments,” ABC News, October 18, 2023.
[2] Ibid.
[4] “Israel-Hamas conflict dwell updates: 2 hostages launched by Hamas are American Israeli residents,” NBC News, October 20, 2023; Cassadra Vinograd and Isabel Kershner, “Israel’s Attackers Took More Than 200 Hostages. Here’s What We Know About Them,” New York Times, October 24, 2023; “Israel revises dying toll from Oct. 7 Hamas assault, dropping it from 1,400 to 1,200,” Times of Israel, November 11, 2023; Cassandra Vinograd and Isabel Kershner, “Israel’s Attackers Took About 240 Hostages. Here’s What to Know About Them,” New York Times, November 20, 2023.
[5] “Israeli forensic groups describe indicators of torture, abuse,” Reuters, October 15, 2023; “Images of the Mass Kidnapping of Israelis by Hamas,” Atlantic, October 9, 2023; Georgina Lee, “What is a conflict crime and did Hamas commit conflict crimes in its assault on Israel?” Channel 4, October 11, 2023.
[6] Armin Rosen, “How Hamas Fooled the Experts,” Tablet Magazine, October 12, 2023.
[7] “Imam Khomeini Exposed Israeli Crimes,” International Affairs Department, Institute for Compilation and Publication of Imam Khomeini’s Works, May 9, 2014.
[8] James M. Markham, “Arafat, in Iran, Reports Khomeini Pledges Aid for Victory Over Israeli,” New York Times, February 19, 1979.
[9] Jonathan C. Ral, “PLO Chief, in Iran, Hails Shah’s Fall,” Washington Post, February 19, 1979.
[10] Amir Vahdat and Jon Gambrell, “Iran chief says Israel a ‘cancerous tumor’ to be destroyed,” Associated Press, May 22, 2020.
[12] “Iran’s Khamenei lauds Hamas assault on Israel, once more denies involvement,” Times of Israel, October 10, 2023.
[13] Jack Khoury and Reuters, “Hezbollah’s Nasrallah Praises ‘Heroic’ Oct 7 Hamas Attack, Says It Was ‘100% Palestinian,’” Haaretz, November 3, 2023.
[14] “Kalimat al-sayyid hassan nasrallah khalal al-ahatifal al-takrimi lishuhada ‘ala tariq al-quds,“ Spot Shot Video, YouTube, November 3, 2023.
[15] “Treasury Designates Hizballah Commander Responsible for American Deaths in Iraq,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, November 19, 2012.
[16] Scott Glover, Curt Devine, Majlie de Puy Kamp, and Scott Bronstein, “‘They’re opportunistic and adaptive’: How Hamas is utilizing cryptocurrency to boost funds,” CNN, October 12, 2023.
[17] Michael Evans, “How Iran’s tech and selfmade weapons gave Hamas energy to strike Israel,” The Times (London), October 11, 2023; Fabian Hinz, “Iran Transfers Rockets to Palestinian Groups,” Wilson Center, May 19, 2021; Nakissa Jahanbani, Muhammad Najjar, Benjamin Johnson, Caleb Benjamin, and Muhammad al-`Ubaydi, “Iranian Drone Proliferation is Scaling Up and Turning More Lethal,” War on the Rocks, September 9, 2023.
[18] Yonah Jeremy Bob, “Iran-Hezbollah assist Hamas, Islamic Jihad trounce Israel with propaganda – unique,” Jerusalem Post, December 6, 2021.
[19] Nancy Ezzeddine and Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran’s Increasingly Decentralized Axis of Resistance,” War on the Rocks, July 14, 2022.
[20] Colin Clarke and Phillip Smyth, “The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shi`a Foreign Fighter Network,” CTC Sentinel 10:10 (2017).
[21] “Al-Sadr vows to defend Iran,” Al Jazeera, January 22, 2006.
[22] John Davison and Ahmed Rasheed, “Rift between Tehran and Shi’ite cleric fuels instability in Iraq,” Reuters, August 23, 2022.
[23] Sam Wyer, “The Resurgence of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq,” Institute for the Study of War, December 2012.
[24] “The Qayis al-Khazali Papers,” American Enterprise Institute, August 2018; Bryce Loidolt, “Iranian Resources and Shi`a Militant Cohesion: Insights from the Khazali Papers,” CTC Sentinel 12:1 (2019).
[25] “Tactical Interrogation Report 1,” Khazali Files, American Enterprise Institute, March 21, 2007.
[26] “Tactical Interrogation Report 4,” Khazali Files, American Enterprise Institute, March 26, 2007.
[27] “Tactical Interrogation Report 11,” Khazali Files, American Enterprise Institute, March 26, 2007.
[28] Phillip Smyth, “Iranian Militias in Iraq’s Parliament: Political Outcomes and U.S. Response,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, June 11, 2018.
[31] Matthew Levitt and Phillip Smyth, “Kataib al-Imam Ali: Portrait of an Iraqi Shiite Militant Group Fighting ISIS,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 5, 2015.
[32] Phillip Smyth, “Making Sense of Iraq’s PMF Arrests,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 26, 2019.
[33] “Iraq chaos as al-Sadr supporters storm Green Zone after he quits,” Al Jazeera, August 29, 2022; Firas Elias, “Deciphering Muqtada al-Sadr’s Decision to Shut Down Saraya al-Salam,” Emirates Policy Center, November 21, 2021.
[34] “Tashiya ahd ‘anasr kata’ib sayyid al-shuhada fi al-basra alathi saqat fi suriya,” National Iraqi News Agency, May 6, 2013.
[36] For examples of this sort of pressure-based exercise that existed in Syria as Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas started to splinter, see Phillip Smyth, “Iran Is Outpacing Assad for Control of Syria’s Shia Militias,” Policy Watch 2955, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 12, 2018.
[37] Suadad al-Salhy, “Exclusive: Asaib Ahl al-Haq defying Iran to assault US in Iraq,” Middle East Eye, December 12, 2020.
[38] See Official Harakat Hizballah al-Nujaba Telegram, Telegram, January 12, 2022.
[39] Nakissa Jahanbani, “Reviewing Iran’s Proxies by Region: A Look Toward the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa,” CTC Sentinel 13:5 (2020).
[40] Michael C. Horowitz, “The Rise and Spread of Suicide Bombing,” Annual Review of Political Science 18 (2015); Tamara Zieve, “This Week In History: Terror assault on Bus 405,” Jerusalem Post, July 1, 2012.
[41] Erik Skare, A History of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), pp. 23-24; Ilan Ben Zion and Fares Akram, “A have a look at the Islamic Jihad motion in Gaza,” Associated Press, November 12, 2019.
[42] Jim Zanotti, “Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, December 2, 2010, p. 23.
[43] “laqa’ al-sayyid hassan nasrallah mah khaled meshal 2010-1-16,” al-’alaqat ala’alamiyah fi Hizballah, July 10, 2019.
[44] Josef Federman, “Israel: Slain Hamas chief smuggled Iranian arms,” Associated Press, January 31, 2010.
[45] Zanotti, p. 23.
[46] Phillip Smyth, “The Shiite Jihad in Syria and its Regional Effects,” Policy Focus 138, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 2, 2015, p. 7.
[47] Ibid., pp. 3-12.
[48] Hassan Hassan, “How the Muslim Brotherhood Hijacked Syria’s Revolution,” Foreign Policy, March 13, 2013.
[49] Mamoon Alabbasi, “How did Hamas’s army experience find yourself with Syria’s rebels?” Middle East Eye, May 23, 2015.
[50] Ibid.
[51] Abby Sewell, “Some Palestinians return to Syria’s war-battered Yarmouk camp,” Times of Israel, November 17, 2022; “Syria authorities rocket assault kills 15 Palestinian refugees: activists,” Reuters, July 24, 2013.
[52] Zeina Karam, “Syrian rebels advance, oblivious to infighting,” Associated Press, March 25, 2013.
[53] Avi Issacharoff, “Hamas Brutally Assaults Shi’ite Worshippers in Gaza,” Haaretz, January 17, 2012.
[54] “Estimated 60 p.c of Yarmouk destroyed amid violence: Group,” Al Jazeera, April 27, 2018.
[55] “Za’in hamas yajtama’ mah mursi w yishid bil’ahd al-jidiid fi misr,” Reuters, July 19, 2012.
[56] Harriet Sherwood, “Hamas and Iran rebuild ties three years after falling out over Syria,” Guardian, January 9, 2014.
[57] Nidal al-Mughrabi, “Hamas says its Iran ties worsen over Syrian civil conflict,” Reuters, June 19, 2023.
[58] Skare, p. 193; Arwa Ibrahim, “Iranian help very important for Hamas after ties restored with Syria,” Al Jazeera, September 25, 2022.
[59] Sherwood.
[60] Skare, p. 192.
[61] “Iran tuqaf harakat ‘al-jihad al-islamiyyah,’” Al-Quds al-Arabi, July 5, 2015.
[62] “Iran taqata’ 90% min da’maha li’harakat ‘jihad al-islamiyyah’ bi’falastine,” Al-Khaleej Online, January 10, 2016.
[63] Fadi Shadei, “What is Harakat al-Sabireen and why is Hamas attempting to dam their enlargement?” Al-Monitor, March 18, 2016.
[64] Huda Baroud, “Hamas quashes armed Shiite motion Sabireen in Gaza,” Al-Monitor, March 21, 2019.
[65] Ibid.
[66] Ibid.
[67] Lee Gancman, “Iran-backed jihadi group claims it’s working in West Bank, Jerusalem,” Times of Israel, January 14, 2016. The picture used within the article options the group’s flag. Showing the clenched fist and Kalashnikov-type symbolism is frequent with many Iranian-backed organizations, notably Lebanese Hezbollah, Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah, and the Pakistani Shi`a-staffed Lashkar Zaynabioun.
[68] Baroud.
[69] Ibid.
[70] Angus Berwick and Ian Talley, “Hamas Needed a New Way to Get Money From Iran. It Turned to Crypto,” Wall Street Journal, November 12, 2023.
[72] Ilene R. Prusher, “Fatah, Hamas break up widens amid Gaza conflict,” Christian Science Monitor, January 15, 2009; “Gaza-Based Fatah Splinter Group Performs Military Exercise, Simulated Kidnapping of Israeli Soldier,” MEMRI TV Videos, YouTube, January 18, 2019.
[74] “Kata’ib shuhada al-aqsa,” Al Jazeera, September 4, 2023. Al Jazeera described the connection between Fatah and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade as “ambiguous.”
[75] “The Supreme Leader’s View of Palestine,” Khamenei.ir, August 21, 2018.
[76] Nidhal al-Wahidi, “al-muntahath basm jaysh al-’asifa: al-jarb al-akhira mukhtalfa ‘an sabiqatiha lakana qawmana babsala,” Al-Akhbar, October 16, 2014.
[77] “‘Fatah’ la ‘alaqa lilharakat bama yusma ‘jaysh al-‘asifa’ fi gaza w la na’atrif bih,” Embassy of the State of Palestine in Lebanon, June 14, 2012.
[78] “Bi al-atifaq ma’ qa’ida fatah: majmu’at mughniyeh taghayr ismuha ala ‘jaysh al-’asifah,’” Watan Voice, June 11, 2012.
[79] Adam Goldman and Ellen Nakashima, “CIA and Mossad killed senior Hezbollah determine in automotive bombing,” Washington Post, January 30, 2015.
[80] See “B’fidiu / athna qasaf ghilaf gaza ba’da sawrikh al-lati nafidha abatal al-wahdat al-sarukhia fi kata’ib shuhada al-aqsa- jayth al-’asifa – dhiman marka sayf al-quds,” Fatah al-Asifa Website, May 16, 2021. As late as 2021, Jaysh al-Asifa was nonetheless utilizing Fatah symbolism and leaders to advertise its army actions.
[81] Amar Abu Shebaab, “Qa’id jaysh al-’asifa li ‘raya’: tawhid miqatli fatah lays ‘asira w al-’alaqa mah al-qassam taybeh,” Raya, April 20, 2014.
[82] “Al-qaidi salem thabet yakshaf tafasiyl jadida w khatira huwl ‘amliat asduud,” Aqsa Press, March 14, 2013.
[83] Shebaab.
[84] Al-Wahidi.
[85] Shebaab.
[86] Kata’ib al-Muqawama al-Watani official Telegram, Telegram, November 10, 2020.
[87] “Kata’ib shuhada al-aqsa tuwkad ‘amaq al-’alaqa ma’ hizb allah w tahudhir in muamarat l’tasfiya qadhia falastine baghita’ ‘arabi,” Tasnim News, June 18, 2013.
[88] Tamar Pileggi, “Fatah’s armed wing in Gaza asks Iran for cash to combat Israel,” Times of Israel, August 18, 2015.
[89] Liwa al-Amoudi official telegram web page, Telegram, February 23, 2023.
[90] Toameh.
[91] Shuhada al-Aqsa Liwa al-Amoudi, Telegram, October 5, 2023.
[92] Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Telegram, October 7, 2023.
[93] Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Telegram, October 7, 2023.
[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.
[96] Official Mujahideen Brigades Telegram, Telegram, October 7, 2023.
[97] Official Mujahideen Brigades Telegram, Telegram, October 8, 2023.
[98] “Al-shahid al-qa’id umar atiya abu shari’ah ‘abu hafs’ muwsas harakat al-mujahedeen,” Ardh Kanaan, April 24, 2015.
[99] “’Kata’ib al-mujahideen’: musta’adanah l’ma’arkat tahrir falastin al-muhtlah,” al-khanadeq, March 1, 2022.
[100] Ibid.
[101] “Ma’ah al-amin | al-amin al-’alam liharakat al-mujahidin al-falastiniyah dr. asa’advert abu shari’ah li ‘mirat al-jazeera’: al-waqa’ al-falastini bihaja l’huwar astratiji w al-tawafaq ‘ala takamul al-adwar bayn al-fasa’il,” Mirat al-Jazeera, September 13, 2021.
[102] Ibid.
[103] Official Nasr al-Din Brigades Telegram, Telegram, October 7, 2023.
[104] Official Nasr al-Din Brigades Telegram, Telegram, October 7, 2023.
[105] Kamal al-Ja’abri, “Jaal abu samahdana: jineral al-muqawama,” al-Akhbar, June 11, 2022.
[106] “Hikaya al-shahid ‘abu ‘ataya..muhandis al-muqawama al-falastinia,” al-Mayadeen, July 1, 2022.
[107] Al-Ja’abri.
[108] “Hikaya al-shahid ‘abu ‘ataya..muhandis al-muqawama al-falastinia.”
[109] “Aghtial musa arafat dharba muja’a lahiba al-sultat al-falastinia,” AFP, September 8, 2005.
[110] Ibid.
[111] “Hikaya al-shahid ‘abu ‘ataya..muhandis al-muqawama al-falastinia.”
[112] Hanan Greenberg, “Who are you, Jama Abu Samhadana,” YNet, June 9, 2006.
[113] “Army of Islam Says Shalit Now Solely Under Control of Hamas,” Haaretz, July 4, 2007.
[114] Nadim Shehadi, “Lebanon is revisiting the ghost of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict,” Arab News, November 3, 2023.
[115] “Alwiat al-nasir salah al-din: iran w hizballah huma al-da’am al-wahad lilmuqawama.. w basmat al-shahid suleimani kan hadhria fi ma’arka ‘sayf al-quds,” Al-Manar, May 25, 2021.
[116] Ibid.
[117] “Meen nehna,” Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia.
[118] Steven Erlanger, “A Life of Unrest,” New York Times Magazine, July 15, 2007.
[119] Ibid.
[120] “Fatah Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades’ dissidents march within the streets of Gaza Strip on May 24, 2006,” Abaca Press, May 24, 2006.
[121] “Al-fasa’il al-falastinia tashid baldur al-riadi al-iran fi al-mintaqa,” al-Alam, April 6, 2011.
[122] “‘Al-ahrar’ al-falastinia: amwal iran l’da’am sumud sha’abina hay wajib ‘ala al-amia,” Kayan al-Arabi, February 29, 2016.
[123] Ibid.
[124] “Harakat al-ahrar al-falastinia – kata’ib al-ansar al-jund al-’askari li harakat al-ahrar, yaduk al-maghtusbat bi 9 saroukh,” Watan Voice, November 15, 2012.
[125] “Khalid Abu Hilal ya’alin istaqalta min (al-ahrar) w yabai’a’ harakat hamas,” Duniya al-Watan, May 25, 2021.
[126] “Al-amin al-’alam li harakat al-ahrar w wafd min qa’ida al-harakat fi zayara a sami nufal ‘abu shayma’ li tahanta bimansaba al-jadiid ra’isan lidiiwan al-madhlam,” Al-Ahrar, October 3, 2023.
[127] Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia’s official Telegram, Telegram, October 9, 2023.
[128] Harakat al-Ahrar al-Falastinia’s official Telegram, Telegram, October 12, 2023.
[129] Joe Truzman, “Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades,” X, October 11, 2023.>
[130] “Ministers of Murder: Iran’s New Security Cabinet,” Human Rights Watch, November 23, 2005, pp. 3-8.
[131] “ Study Islam, Khomeini Suggests to Gorbachev,” New York Times, January 5, 1989.
[132] “When Plane Hijackings Were Palestinian Terrorists’ Weapon of Choice,” Haaretz, March 29, 2016.
[133] “PFLP, DFLP, PFLP-GC, Palestinian leftists,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 31, 2005.
[134] Ehud Yaari, “The ‘Muqawama’ Doctrine,” Jerusalem Report, November 13, 2006.
[135] Ahmed Gomaa, “Abu Ahmed Fouad: We are decided to unify Palestine and we is not going to negotiate with Israeli occupation,” Egypt Today, November 23, 2017.
[136] Hazem Balousha, “Iran Increases Aid to PFLP Thanks to Syria Stance,” Al-Monitor, September 17, 2013.
[137] PFLP’s Kata’ib al-Shahid Abu Ali Mustafa Official Telegram, Telegram, October 7, 2023.
[138] “Al-jebhat al-sha’abiyah fi lubnan taltaqi al-safir alairania,” PFLP Official Website, March 28, 2023; “nasrallah istadafa qa’ida ‘al-jebha al-sha’abiyah,” Al-Akhbar, June 29, 2022.
[139] Muhammad ‘Eid, “Ba’advert min ‘ata al-shahid suleimani lilqadhiyah al-filastinia,” al-Ahed, January 11, 2021.
[140] Phillip Smyth, “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Syrian Civil War,” MERIA Journal, summer time 2013.
[143] Abdallah Dhibian, “Madha na’arif ‘an ‘al-tairat al-shara’iyatu’… w kayf hajmat mustawtanat al-lihtilali?” al-Mayadeen, October 10, 2023.
[144] “Inside the arsenal: Iranian-sourced weapons utilized in Hamas and Islamic Jihad’s Israel assault,” France24, October 13, 2023.
[145] Smyth, “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Syrian Civil War.”
[146] Adam Dolnik, Understanding Terrorist Innovation: Technology, Tactics and Global Trends (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2007), p. 93.
[147] Ibid., p. 82.
[148] Gary Gambill, “Sponsoring Terrorism: Syria and the PFLP-GC,” Middle East Intelligence Bulletin 4:3 (2002).
[149] Ibid.
[150] Ibid.
[151] Harold M. Cubert, The PFLP’s Changing Role within the Middle East (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 109.
[152] “Qara’a fi ziara harakat hamas…al-dala’il w al-risa’il,” al-Alam, October 20, 2022; “Al-amin al-’alam al-jebhat al-sha’abia al-tahrir falastin – al-qa’ida al-’amia talal naji li’mirat al-jazeera’: al-ikhtilal al-hasal fi al-dakhil al-sahyouni ya’ibir ‘an azma kian burimmatheh,” Mirat al-Jazeera, July 4, 2022.
[153] Smyth, “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) and the Syrian Civil War.”
[154] Mohammed Suliman, “PFLP on Defense in Gaza Over Ties to Assad,” Al-Monitor, December 28, 2012.
[155] Yusef Fakhr al-Din and Hamam al-Khatib, “al-takamal al-qatil: ‘tanzim al-qaida al-’amma’ w ‘liwa al-quds,’” Syrian Center for Legal Studies and Research, March 21, 2019.
[156] “Militant blames Israel for Beirut blast,” BBC, May 20, 2002.
[157] “Al-sha’abia tatabana qutl mustawtniin qarb al-khat al-akhdhar,” Al Jazeera, October 20, 2023.
[158] “Kata’ib al-shahid jihad jibril al-jinah al-’askari al-jebha al-sha’abiyah al-qa’ida al-amliat yihajam dawriya lilatilal bi’nabulus,” Maan News, September 25, 2005.
[159] Jihad Jibril Brigades Official Telegram, Telegram, November 25, 2018.
[160] Jihad Jibril Brigades Official Telegram, Telegram, October 9, 2023.
[161] Carl Anthony Wege, “Hizbollah–Syrian Intelligence Affairs: A Marriage of Convenience,” Journal of Strategic Security 4:3 (2011): p. 5.
[163] M.D. Walhout, Arab Intellectuals and American Power: Edward Said, Charles Malik, and the US within the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2020), p. 83.
[165] Ronen Bergman, Rise and Kill First: The Secret History of Israel’s Targeted Assassinations (New York: Random House, 2018) pp. 189-192.
[166] Daoud Kuttab, “Palestinian Revolutionary Seeks First Visit to Homeland,” Al-Monitor, February 4, 2013.
[167] Shamir Hassan, “Oslo Accords: The Genesis and Consequences for Palestine,” Social Scientist 39:7/8 (2011): pp. 65-69; Qassam Muaddi, “Through grim eyes, Palestinians replicate at 29 years of the Oslo accords,” New Arab, September 14, 2022.
[168] For extra, seek for “DFLP” through the University of Maryland’s START, Global Terrorism Database.
[169] “Al-jebha al-dimiqratia litahrir falastine fi lubnan ta’aqid mutamarha al-hadi ‘ashr,” Al-Watan Voice, December 12, 2011.
[170] Ibid.
[171] “Nazihun falastiniun min suriya blubnan yahrqun masa’adat muqadema min hizb allah,” Anadolu Agency, May 6, 2013.
[172] Al-Mustafa Rawdh, “ab’advert istihadaf al-falastiniin min qabl nidham al-asad,” Hespress, July 16, 2012.
[173] “DFLP Press Office – Gaza,” Facebook, June 2, 2021.
[174] “Hizb allah istaqbal wafdan min al-jebhat al-dimiqratiya: intisar jenin mismar jdiid fi na’ash al-kayan,” National News Agency – Lebanon, July 5, 2023.
[175] Matthew Levitt, “The Return of Palestinian Nationalist Terrorism,” Policy Watch 379, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, May 3, 2002.
[176] “‘Al-muqawama al-watania’ takhrij dawra al-shahid hassan mansour lil’ashrat min muqataliha fi shamal gaza,” Al-Watan Voice, September 24, 2022; KMW’s official Telegram channel.
[177] “Kata’ib al-Muqawama (Quwet Umar al-Qasim) al-’alem al-’askari, October 3, 2021.
[178] “Scenes from the Military Training of the National Resistance Brigades,” KMW’s official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 13, 2019.
[179] KMW’s official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 8, 2019.
[180] “Kata’ib al-muqawama al-wataniyah (quwet al-shahid umar al-qasim) ta’alin istihadaf hajiz bayt furik bi ‘amliat mushtaraka,” Masar News, May 29, 2022.
[181] “Kata’ib al-muqawama al-wataniya tana’a al-shahid al-qaid al-liwa qasim Suleimani,” KMW’s official Telegram channel, Telegram, January 3, 2020.
[182] “Fighters of the National Resistance Brigades go to and congratulate the freed prisoner Alaa Abu Jazar in Rafah South of the Gaza Strip,” Telegram, January 16, 2020.
[183] Chris Zambelis, “Hizb Allah’s Lebanese Resistance Brigades,” CTC Sentinel 7:11 (2014).
[184] Jim Quilty, “Lebanon’s Brush with Civil War,” MERIP, May 20, 2008.
[185] Smyth, “The Shiite Jihad in Syria and Its Regional Effects,” p. 6.
[187] Daniel Egel, Trevor Johnston, and Ben Connable, “The Future of the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces,” RAND, January 25, 2023.
[188] Renad Mansour and Faleh A. Jabar, “The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future,” Carnegie Middle East Center, April 2017.
[189] “Rijal al-dhal yakhruj ila al-nuwar..meen hua ‘abu fadak’ khalifat al-muhandis bi’al-iraq,” Al Jazeera, February 23, 2020.
[190] Smyth, “Making Sense of Iraq’s PMF Arrests.”
[191] Zayd bin Rifah, “al-hashd al-sha’abi..iraqi al-hada’ irani al-qa’ida w al-qarar w al-’aqidah,” Al-Arab, December 31, 2019.
[192] Benedetta Berti, Armed Political Organizations: From Conflict to Integration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013), p. 84.
[193] Ibid., p. 84.
[194] “Iran FM: Formation of joint Hamas-Islamic Jihad room clever resistance transfer,” IRNA, September 1, 2023.
[195] “Lebanon’s Hezbollah chief meets Hamas, Islamic Jihad officers,” AFP, October 25, 2023.
[196] Hamidreza Azizi, “How Iran and Its Allies Hope to Save Hamas,” War on the Rocks, November 16, 2023.
[197] “Shahed..sahafi lubnan: ‘amliyat mishtraka bayn iran w hamas w hizballah adarat al-harb ‘ala gaza,” Sama News, May 29, 2021.
[198] “Ghurfa al’amliat al-mishtraka l’fasa’il al-muqawama al-falastinia. mah tarkiibatha w ahadafha w mahamaha,” Al Jazeera, May 11, 2023.
[199] “Bi al-fidiyu: hamal risalat min qa’id al-qassam w qal: khab min dhin anana nabia’ al-dam bi al-duwlar w al-suwlar w ‘amliyat khan yunis masura,” Madar News, November 16, 2018.
[200] “Bayan sadar ‘an al-ghurfa al-mishtraka al-fasa’il al-muqawama al-falastinia,” Abu Ali al-Mustafa Brigades official web site, December 22, 2018.
[201] “Rada ‘ala alatilal: al-muqawma al-falastinia tuwsa’ daira al-qasaf,” Arab 48, November 12, 2018.
[202] “*Bain ghurfa al’amliat al-mishtraka l’fasa’il al-muqawama al-falastinia*,” Somoud Media Center, May 5, 2019.
[203] “Ghurfa al’amliat al-mishtraka l’fasa’il al-muqawama al-falastinia. mah tarkiibatha w ahadafha w mahamaha.”
[204] JOR official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 29, 2020.
[205] JOR official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 23, 2020.
[206] JOR official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 29, 2020.
[207] JOR official Telegram channel, Telegram, December 30, 2020.
[208] Joe Truzman, “Palestinian Joint Operations Room declares upcoming army maneuver,” Long War Journal, December 27, 2020.
[209] See Joint Operations Room Telegram channels movies and textual content statements, in comparison with different Iranian-backed proxy teams.
[210] “Al-’amiid qaani: iran mustimarat bida’am al-muqawama hata astisal kayan al-’adu,” Al-Ahed, May 15, 2023. It can nonetheless be accessed through net.archive.org.
[211] See “Search Term: al-Ghurfa al-Mushtrakat li-Fasa’il al-Muqawama,” Al-Mayadeen, May 9, 2022-September 12, 2023 (six articles have been listed); “Search Term: al-Ghurfa al-Mushtrakat li-Fasa’il al-Muqawama,” Al-Manar, May 2-May 10, 2023 (three articles have been listed); al-Etejah (Iraq’s Kata’ib Hezbollah): “Fasa’il al-muqawama al-falastinia ta’lan italaq ma’arka ‘sayf al-quds,’ w tastahilaha biqasaf mukthaf istahdaf muhit tel abeeb,” al-Etejah, May 11, 2021.
[212] Oded Yaron, “Hamas Drone Assault Surprised Israel, Using Russia-Ukraine War Tactics,” Haaretz, October 9, 2023; Ryan Brobst, Bradley Bowman, and Mike Daum, “Hamas used Iranian-produced weapons in October 7 terror assault in Israel,” Long War Journal, October 19, 2023.
[213] Dan De Luce and Lisa Cavazuti, “Gaza is suffering from poverty, however Hamas has no scarcity of money. Where does it come from?” NBC News, October 25, 2023.
[214] Marco Hernandez and Josh Holder, “The Tunnels of Gaza,” New York Times, November 10, 2023.
[215] Sanaa Alswerky, “Question marks hover over proposed Gaza-Turkey flights from Israeli airport,” Media Line/Jerusalem Post, July 7, 2023.
[216] “PFLP-GC chief: Iran’s Soleimani supervised Palestinian weapons-development program,” Jewish News Syndicate, August 26, 2021.
[217] “Hamas fi lubnan tuwasis ‘taliy’ah tufan al-aqsa’ limuqawama alahitilal,” Al Jazeera, December 4, 2023.
[218] Ian Bremmer, “The Gaza Invasion Will Not Make Israel Safer,” Time Magazine, October 31, 2023.
[219] “Taghtia sahafiya: majmu’at tatliq ‘ala nafsiha ‘ibna abu jandal’ w tatakawan min afrad fi al-ajihaza al-alamina ta’lan w ‘abr bayan laha ‘muhla 24 sa’at la ‘alan al-rais abbas al-muajahat al-shamlia ma’ah alahtilal auw al-tamrud ‘ala auw amr al-ajihaza,” Nabd, November 5, 2023.